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Abstract
Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz
has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central fea-
ture of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism
about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with
objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz’s theory and call-
ing attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent
incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that
this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted
doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities.
When we reflect on the contributions of early modern philosophy to our un-
derstanding of the metaphysics of “sensible” or “secondary” qualities such
as color, those of Locke and Boyle readily spring to mind, as may those of
Descartes, Berkeley, and others.1 But one philosopher we aren’t likely to think
of in this connection is Leibniz. Despite all the attention his philosophy has
received over the years, little has been written about his views on the nature of
color. To make matters worse, what little has been written has not painted him
in a particularly flattering light. Margaret Wilson, for instance, has argued that
Leibniz does not even have a single consistent way of thinking about sensible
qualities (Wilson, 1977). On her reading, his thought exhibits a “pervasive”
and “unrationalized” ambivalence toward the nature of such qualities, which
manifests itself in a tendency to vacillate uncritically and unselfconsciously
between the view that they are reducible to the mechanical qualities of bodies
(shapes, motions, etc.), and the incompatible view that they are something like
experiences caused in us by such qualities.2 In light of all this, we may well
be tempted to conclude that Leibniz gave little thought to the question of the
∗Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
1On Locke’s theory of color, see, among others, Jackson 1929; Curley 1972; Alexander 1976/77;
Rickless 1997; Stuart 2003; Jacovides 2007. On Boyle’s, see Curley 1972; Keating 1993; Anstey 2000,
Chapter 4. On Descartes’, see Cottingham 1989/90; Nolan Forthcoming. On Berkeley’s, see Wilson
1987; Faaborg 1999; Atherton 2003. The views of Malebranche (Schmaltz, 1995) and Reid (Ganson,
2002; McKitrick, 2002) have also garnered some attention.
2I will follow Leibniz throughout in referring to colors, sounds, odors, flavors, and the like
as sensible qualities. In accordance with scholastic tradition, “sensible” in this context contrasts
1
LEIBNIZ’S METAPHYSICS OF COLOR
nature of color, and perhaps even that he has nothing interesting to say on the
subject.
In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. Though to be sure, Leib-
niz never offers anything like a systematic presentation of a theory of color, his
writings do nonetheless contain a rich array of remarks on the topic. Some of
these remarks appear in familiar writings such as the New Essays on Human Un-
derstanding; others are scattered throughout various letters, notes, and essays
that are neither as familiar nor as accessible. By bringing the most significant of
these remarks together, I hope to show in what follows that it is indeed possi-
ble to reconstruct a distinctively Leibnizian theory of color. More importantly,
I hope to show that this theory is worthy of our consideration. As I will argue,
Leibniz aims to combine a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reduction
of color to the microphysical (or micromechanical) qualities of the bodies that
appear colored to us in perception. Such a combination of perspectives might
seem contradictory, given that the reductive component appears to entail some
kind of objectivism about color. As we will see, however, this is the case only
given a certain view of the ontological status of bodies and their qualities that
Leibniz explicitly rejects. By rejecting this view, he is able to harmonize two
approaches to color that would otherwise be incompatible. The result, I will
argue, is a highly distinctive and philosophically interesting, though perhaps
ultimately unsatisfactory, theory of color.
My reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory will proceed along the following lines.
In the first section, I identify two important respects in which Leibniz can be
considered a subjectivist about color. In the second, I argue that despite his
subjectivist leanings, Leibniz parts company with many subjectivists by hold-
ing that color is not a sensation or any other modification of the mind. Instead,
he insists that color is a modification of bodies. In the third section, I contend
that Leibniz views colors not as primitive, irreducible qualities of bodies, but
rather as reducible to qualities of the sort countenanced in physics. In this re-
spect his view can be considered an ancestor of the position known as physical-
ism in contemporary debates about color. Finally, I turn to the apparent tension
between Leibniz’s subjectivism and his reductivist stance. After arguing that
he has the resources to reconcile these apparently incompatible perspectives, I
conclude that, ironically, the very move that allows him to avoid contradiction
must be regarded as the most obvious drawback of his theory.3
not with “insensible” but with “intelligible,” where intelligible qualities include sizes, shapes, and
motions. The distinguishing feature of intelligible qualities is that they, unlike sensible qualities,
can be given what Leibniz calls a nominal definition, that is, roughly, a definition that supplies
marks sufficient for distinguishing the definiendum from other things (A 6.4:585–92/AG 23–27).
Even though shapes, sizes, and motions can be sensed, then, in Leibniz’s terminology they are
classified as intelligible rather than sensible qualities.
3Though I will be arguing that Leibniz has a single, consistent theory of color, I will not in
this essay be engaging directly with Wilson’s arguments to the contrary. I have criticized those
arguments in detail elsewhere (Puryear, Forthcoming-a) and will not rehash my criticisms here.
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1 Subjectivism
Broadly speaking, a theory of color can be regarded as a form of subjectivism
to the extent that it represents color as in some way bound up with perception
or with the perceiving subject. For example, any theory which construes color
as a perception-dependent feature of the world can be considered a kind of
subjectivism, as can any theory on which color exists only in the mind of the
perceiver. As we will see in this section, Leibniz endorses both of these closely
related subjectivist ideas.4
Leibniz frequently characterizes colors as appearances or, equivalently, phe-
nomena. To give just two examples, in a 1687 letter to Arnauld he claims that
accidental unities such as mobs, machines, and societies “become realized only
by thoughts and appearances, like colors and other phenomena, which we nev-
ertheless call real” (GP 2:100/AG 89).5 Nearly thirty years later, toward the end
of his life, he has this to say in a letter to Des Bosses:
[I] should prefer to say that there are no substances over and above
monads, but only appearances, but that these are not illusory, like
a dream, or like a sword pointing at us out of a concave mirror,
or like Doctor Faust eating up a cartful of hay, but that they are
true phenomena, that is, in the sense that a rainbow or parhelion is
an appearance, and, in fact, in the sense that colors are appearances
according to the Cartesians and in reality. (GP 2:504/L 614, emphasis
mine)6
Such texts are significant because appearances and phenomena would seem to
exist only insofar as something is being perceived. As Robert Adams (1994,
219) explains, “‘Phenomenon’ is a Greek word that means ‘appearance’, or
4These two subjectivist claims do not come to the same thing. One might hold that colors exist
outside the mind even if they depend on perception for their existence, much as a theist might
say that the universe, though existing outside of God, nevertheless depends upon God’s mental
activity for its existence. Conversely, one might hold that colors exist only in the mind while at the
same time denying that they depend on perception for their existence, much as a rationalist might
say that innate ideas, which exist only in the mind, nevertheless exist there independently of our
perception.
5The following abbreviations will be used for citations of Leibniz’s works. A: Sa¨mtliche Schriften
und Briefe, edited by Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt und Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1923–), cited by series, volume, and page number; AG: G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays,
edited by R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989); C: Opuscules et fragments ine´dits
de Leibniz, edited by L. Couturat (Paris: Fe´lix Alcan, 1903); DM: Discourse on Metaphysics, cited by
section number; GM: Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften, edited by C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: A. Asher,
1849–63), cited by volume and page number; GP: Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, edited by C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1875–90), cited by volume
and page number; L: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd edition, edited
by L. Loemker (Boston: Kluwer, 1989); LC: The Labyrinth of the Continuum, edited by R. A. T. Arthur
(New Haven: Yale, 2001); LDB: The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, edited by B. Look and
D. Rutherford (New Haven: Yale, 2007); NE: New Essays on Human Understanding, cited by page
number from A 6.6; T: Essays on Theodicy, cited by section number; WF: Leibniz’s “New System” and
Associated Contemporary Texts, edited by R. S. Woolhouse and R. Francks (New York: Oxford, 1997).
6See also, among others, GP 1:384/WF 53; L 343, 365, 390.
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more literally ‘thing that appears’. Things that appear are objects of aware-
ness to someone to whom they appear. . . . In calling them phenomena Leibniz
means that they have their being in perceptions that represent this story to per-
ceiving beings.” Indeed Leibniz himself characterizes phenomena as “being[s]
of the imagination or perception” (A 2.2:185/AG 86; cf. GP 6:586/AG 263). He
also locates them in the soul (GP 6:589/AG 265) and likens them to “continual
dreams” (GP 2:435–46/AG 199; cf. GP 1:374). In characterizing colors as phe-
nomena, then, he is implicitly suggesting that such qualities exist only in the
perceiving subject, and that they depend on that subject for their existence.
Other evidence points in the same direction. First, Leibniz characterizes
what he calls “apparent qualities” as qualities that “are not in things absolutely,
but only insofar as they act on us” (A 6.4:555). In calling colors appearances,
however, he appears to be suggesting that they are just such qualities. So his
thought is evidently that colors exist only insofar as we perceive them. Sec-
ond, in the New Essays he characterizes colors and other sensible qualities as
phantoˆmes, akin to the “phantoˆme of transparence” that arises when a cogwheel
spins so fast that its teeth disappear (NE 403-4; cf. 392). Yet elsewhere he de-
scribes heat as “a phantoˆme depending partly on our present constitution” (GP
6:568/WF 197). Assuming, plausibly enough, that phantoˆmes in general have
this property of depending on our constitution, it follows from what Leibniz
says in the New Essays that color is a perceiver-dependent feature of the world.
Finally, Leibniz emphasizes that our notions of color and other sensible quali-
ties (or rather the objects of such notions) are imaginary.7 But he also character-
izes imaginary notions as those which “are not in things outside of us, but the
essence of which is to appear to us” (A 6.4:70/LC 231). Again the point seems
to be that colors, as appearances, are not found in anything outside of us, but
rather exist only within us.
Leibniz’s most illuminating remarks about the subjectivity of color appear
in his extensive commentary on Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy. In Part 1
of the Principles Descartes discusses our propensity to make false judgments,
as when “on seeing a color . . . we supposed we were seeing a thing located
outside us which closely resembled the idea of color that we experience within
us at the time” (§66, CSM 1:216).8 Such judgments are false, Descartes thinks,
because colors do not exist outside of us. Like pains, they are “clearly and
distinctly perceived when they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts”
rather than as “real things existing outside our mind” (§68, CSM 1:217).9 In
Leibniz’s commentary, these remarks receive a rather warm reception:
On Articles 65-68. Descartes, following the ancients, rendered a
useful service in eradicating the prejudice that makes heat, colors,
7See Discourse on Metaphysics, §12; Leibniz to Foucher, n.d., GP 1:392/WF 55; Specimen of Dis-
coveries of the Admirable Secrets of Nature in General, A 6.4:1623/GP 7:314/LC 315.
8‘CSM’ abbreviates The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, edited by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff,
and D. Murdoch (New York: Cambridge University Press), cited by volume and page number.
9Cf. §71 of the Principles, Part 1, where Descartes claims that “sensations of tastes, smells,
sounds, heat, cold, light, colors and so on . . . do not represent anything located outside our
thought.”
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and other phenomena seem to be things outside of us, since it is
evident that the same hand on which water seemed very hot soon
finds it tepid; and a man who observes a green color in a powdered
mixture no longer sees it as green when his eye is aided by an in-
strument but as a mixture of yellow and blue and can grasp the
causes of these two colors with the use of better instruments and
other observations or reasons. From these considerations it seems
that no such thing exists outside of us the phantasm of which ap-
pears to our imagination. We are commonly like boys who have
been convinced that there is a pot of gold at the very end of the
rainbow where it touches the earth and who run toward it in a vain
effort to find it. (GP 4:365/L 390–91)
Once again we find Leibniz characterizing colors as phenomena, phantasms,
and things which appear (to our imagination), though here he goes even fur-
ther, explicitly signaling his agreement with Descartes that colors do not exist
outside of us. (His point is presumably not that they don’t exist at all, but that
they exist only within us.) What makes this passage particularly significant,
though, is that it reveals at least part of Leibniz’s rationale for adopting a sub-
jectivist orientation toward sensible qualities. The argument is a familiar one.
Which particular sensible qualities an object appears to have, says Leibniz, is
highly sensitive to changes in the perceiver. For instance, the same water can
feel at first hot and then tepid to the very same hand, even if the temperature
of the water remains unchanged. Likewise, a powder that appears green to
the naked eye can appear yellow and blue when viewed under a microscope.10
In all such cases, the appearances change not because of any intrinsic changes
in the object perceived but because of changes either in the perceiver or in the
relationship between the perceiver and the object. However, if such qualities
truly inhered in the object, and did so independently of our perceptions, then
according to Leibniz this would not be the case: the appearances to which they
give rise would not be so fickle. Hence, he concludes that these qualities do
not thus inhere in such objects, and instead exist only within us and depend
on us for their existence. In short, the highly variable nature of sensible quality
perception leads him to conclude that colors and other such qualities are not
objective but subjective qualities.
As it stands, the argument suffers from a serious flaw. Properly speaking,
the mere fact that sensible quality appearances are highly sensitive to changes
in the perceiver does not show that the qualities themselves are subjective;
rather, it shows only that the appearances of these qualities are subjective. It
therefore remains open to the objectivist to admit that the appearances are sub-
jective while denying that the qualities themselves are subjective. That is, the
objectivist could hold that the qualities themselves are objective, even though
the way they appear is highly sensitive to changes in the perceiver. Now, Leib-
niz does not himself address this wrinkle in the dispute between subjectivists
10Cf. Philonous’ “microscope argument” in the first of Berkeley’s Three Dialogues bewteen Hylas
and Philonous.
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and objectivists. However, I would like to suggest one way in which he might
have responded to this objectivist line. In brief, the problem is that in taking
this position the objectivist threatens to make it impossible for us to discover
which particular sensible qualities belong to a given object. If there is such a
thing as the true, objective color of an object, the only basis on which we could
ever discover this color would be the way the object looks with respect to color.
But generally speaking there isn’t just one way an object looks with respect to
color. Further, there seems to be no non-arbitrary way of deciding which of the
many colors the object appears to have is its true, objective color.11 Thus if we
admit that objects have objective colors, then it seems that the subjectivity of
color appearances prevents us from discovering which colors these are. In or-
der for the particular colors of bodies to be knowable, then, it will be necessary
to eschew objectivism in favor of some sort of subjectivism along the lines of
the view that identifies the color of an object with its apparent color. Although
there is no explicit evidence of it, I speculate that something like this consider-
ation may have been operating in the background of Leibniz’s thinking when
he formulated the preceding argument for subjectivism.
Insofar as he thinks color has its being in perception and exists only within
the perceiving subject, Leibniz’s theory constitutes a broadly subjectivist ap-
proach. At the same time, however, he makes an important concession to the
objectivist. For purposes of contrast, consider the radical subjectivist who goes
so far as to say that the color of an object is always relative to individual per-
ceivers. On this sort of view, there will generally speaking be no such thing
as the color of an object, since objects typically appear differently colored to
different perceivers; at most an object will have a certain color only relative to
a given perceiver or range of perceivers. Now the point to note here is that
Leibniz is not prepared to take his subjectivism this far. Although he admits
that color depends on and exists only within individual perceivers, he denies
that it is relative to individual perceivers. Instead, he holds that the color of an
object is simply the color it appears to have to perceivers under the most usual
circumstances. As he explains in the New Essays:
As for warmth, when our hand is very warm, the lesser warmth of
the water does not make itself felt, and instead tempers that of the
hand, and consequently the water seems cold to us. In the same
way salt water from the Baltic Sea mixed with water from the Sea
of Portugal diminishes its specific salinity, even though the former
is salty itself. Thus in a way we can say that the warmth belongs to
the water in a bath, even if it may appear cold to someone; just as
11In the microscope case one might follow Armstrong (1969) in holding that the objective color
of the object is the color it appears to have under the greatest magnification. On Leibniz’s view,
however, this will not work, because the color an object appears to have when magnified to any
given degree will always give way to yet another color under further magnification. As he explains
in the New Essays, “[I]f our eyes became better equipped or more penetrating, so that some colors
or other qualities disappeared from our view, others would appear to arise out of them, and we
should need a further increase in acuity to make them disappear too; and since matter is actually
divided to infinity, this process could go on to infinity also” (NE 219).
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honey is called sweet absolutely, and silver white, although the one
appears sour, the other yellow to some sick people: for things are
named according to what is most ordinary . . . . (NE 132)
According to this passage, there is a sense in which objects can be considered
to have a certain sensible quality tout court, even though they may not appear
to have this quality to all perceivers at all times. For the quality that truly
belongs to the thing, Leibniz says, is the one it appears to have under the most
ordinary circumstances. Thus, even though an object’s color will be relative
to perceivers in general, since the colors things appear to have to perceivers
under the most usual circumstances will be a function of the constitution of
those perceivers, it will not be relative to individual perceivers.
This nuance in Leibniz’s subjectivism is important for two reasons. First,
it allows him to capture at least part of what we find attractive about objec-
tivist approaches to color: namely, the thought that every object has a single,
determinate color or combination of colors despite appearing to have differ-
ent colors to different perceivers and to the same perceivers at different times.
Second, the nuance is important because it makes room for the possibility of
color misperception. One of the most pressing problems for the more extreme
form of subjectivism described above is that it threatens to make errors in color
perception impossible, something that many philosophers would consider ob-
jectionable.12 The problem is that if an object appears to have a certain color to
some person, then according to this view it really is so colored (relative to that
person). So an object can never appear to have a color that it doesn’t actually
have, at least relative to that perceiver. By tying a thing’s color to its most usual
appearance, however, Leibniz is able to accommodate the natural thought that
a thing’s apparent color can differ from its true color. On his view, errors in
color perception are quite within the realm of possibility. In fact they happen
whenever an object appears to have a color to some perceiver that differs from
the color it appears to have under the most ordinary circumstances.13
2 Colors as Modifications of Bodies
While most early modern philosophers would have agreed with Leibniz that
colors exist only in the mind, most of these same philosophers were convinced
that bodies, together with all their real qualities (e.g., sizes, shapes, motions),
exist outside the mind. From their point of view, then, it stood to reason that col-
ors are not really properties of bodies; for a property is a way of being, and the
12For more on why this seems problematic, see Cohen 2007, §2.1. This issue is closely related to
the objection raised against some theories of representation that they do not allow for misrepre-
sentation.
13The viability of this proposal obviously hinges on whether we can know what color an ob-
ject most frequently appears to have. If we cannot know this, then we will not be able to know
the particular colors of objects, and Leibniz’s view will fall prey to the same objection just raised
against objectivism. It would seem, however, that our prospects for discovering the most common
apparent color of an object are much brighter than our prospects for discovering its objective color
on the basis of its highly variable appearances.
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way of being of a thing, it seems, could hardly exist elsewhere than where the
thing itself exists. Thus Descartes appears to hold that colors are really just sen-
sations in the mind, rather than anything in external objects, and in this he was
followed by the Cartesians, including Malebranche, and many others.14 Indeed
by the time Pierre Bayle published his Historical and Critical Dictionary in 1697,
he could write without qualification that the modern philosophers “teach that
all these qualities are perceptions of our mind, and do not exist in the objects of
our senses.” (1697/1991, 365). In a similar vein, Hume, writing in 1739, could
characterize the opinion that colors and other sensible qualities are “nothing
but impressions in the mind, derived from the operation of external objects,
and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects” as the “fundamen-
tal principle of the modern philosophy” (1739, 1.4.4).
If colors are not properties of external objects, then what, if anything, do
they modify? One answer offered by some seventeenth-century philosophers
is that since colors are not properties of things outside the mind, they must
be properties or modifications of the mind itself. Perhaps the most conspicu-
ous defender of this view is Malebranche, who states quite explicitly that on
his view colors are sensations, and as such are modifications of the soul.15 The
problem is that this way of viewing the matter has some rather counterintuitive
consequences. In the first place, it appears to convict our senses of widespread
error, since our perceptions seem to present colors not as properties of the mind
but as properties of the surfaces of bodies. That may not be a fatal difficulty,
but it should strike us as at least a significant drawback. Even worse, the the-
sis that colors are modifications of the mind seems to be either incoherent or
empirically suspect. If the mind is understood to be immaterial, as most early
modern philosophers did understand it, then the view seems incoherent, since
it would appear to be impossible for something immaterial to have a color. But
if the mind is taken to be something material, such as the brain, then the view
appears to be simply false, since evidently neither the brain nor any other part
of the body takes on the colors that our senses present us with in perception.
In either case, the thesis seems highly implausible.
To Leibniz’s credit, this is one point on which he parts company with Male-
branche and his cohorts. As we have seen, he agrees with his fellow subjec-
tivists that colors exist only in the mind. At the same time, however, he ex-
pressly denies that they are modifications of the mind. Instead, he upholds the
more common-sense position that they are modifications of the bodies that ap-
pear to have those colors in perception. One place where this emerges clearly is
his review of Franc¸ois Lamy’s On the Knowledge of the Self. As Leibniz explains,
Lamy objects that “God leads us into error through our senses, in making us
assign to bodies certain sensible qualities that are only modes [manie`res] of our
minds.” But in raising this objection, Leibniz says, Lamy supposes something
14For Descartes’ view, see CSM 1:217, 3:369, inter alia. See also Desgabets 1983a; 1983b, Chapter
3; Malebranche 1674/75, 1.1.1, 1.12.5; Newton 2004, 13. For a cogent case that even Boyle should
be read as a subjectivist in something like this sense, see Keating 1993.
15See, e.g., Malebranche 1674/75, 1.1.1, 1.12.5. For a helpful discussion of Malebranche’s view
and other examples of Cartesians who thought this way, see Schmaltz 1996, 78–84.
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which is false: “For these sensible qualities are modes [manie`res] or modifica-
tions of bodies and not of our mind; and our sensations are in truth ways of
being of the soul, but ones which represent those of bodies” (GP 4:576/WF
142). Clearly Leibniz wants to resist the move to thinking of colors as modi-
fications or ways of being of the mind, such as sensations. Though he agrees
that they exist in the mind, he nevertheless wants them to be ways of being of
bodies. Whether such a view is coherent is a question we will take up in due
time.
Another text which bears on this point comes from the New Essays. In Book
II, Chapter viii, Leibniz has Locke’s representative, Philalethes, raise the fol-
lowing objection: “But if the relation between the object and the sensation were
natural, how could it happen, as we in fact observe, that the same water can ap-
pear hot to one hand and cold to the other?—something which also shows that heat
is not in the water any more than pain in the pin” (NE 132). We have already
seen that more than a decade earlier, in his commentary on Descartes’ Princi-
ples, Leibniz cited this very same example of perceptual variability as evidence
that heat is merely a phantasm appearing to our imagination and not a quality
existing outside of us. But here, Philalethes tries to draw a further conclusion
from this example: that the warmth which seems to be in the water is in fact
not in the water at all. Leibniz’s response, communicated through Theophilus,
is illuminating:
That [example] proves at most that warmth is not an entirely abso-
lute sensible quality . . . , but that it is relative to the appropriate or-
gans: for a suitable motion in the hand can get mixed there and alter
the appearance. . . . Even the primary qualities (following your ter-
minology), for example unity and number, can fail to appear as they
should; for as M. Descartes has already reported, a globe touching
the fingers in a certain way appears double, and mirrors or lenses
cut to have facets multiply the object. It does not therefore follow
that what does not always appear the same is not a quality of the
object, and that its image does not resemble it. (NE 132)16
Leibniz’s point here is this. The perceptual variability of warmth does indeed
show that it is not an absolute quality—a quality the water has in and of itself—
and that it depends in some way on the organs of perceiving subjects. In other
words, perceptual variability shows that the quality is subjective, just as Leib-
niz had argued in his commentary on the Principles. But it does not follow at all
that warmth is not a quality of the water itself, because if it did we would also
have to say that intelligible or “primary” qualities such as unity and number
are not truly qualities of bodies themselves—something that everyone, includ-
ing Locke, agrees is false. In short, then, the perceptual variability of warmth
shows that it is a subjective quality, but not that it isn’t a quality of the water.
16In place of the first set of ellipses Leibniz has “(i.e., a power of being sensorily detected).” This
parenthetical might be taken as evidence that Leibniz, like Locke, conceives of sensible qualities as
powers or dispositions. However, he is probably just accommodating himself to Locke’s way of
speaking.
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And though Leibniz stops short of explicitly affirming that warmth is a quality
of the water, the implication is that this is his view.
We may therefore conclude that on Leibniz’s view colors are properties in
the mind, without being properties of the mind. In this respect they are akin
to qualities instantiated only in our dreams, which can plausibly be said to be
within the mind but are by no means qualities of the mind.17 In contrast to
philosophers such as Malebranche, Leibniz does not believe that every prop-
erty in the mind must be a property of the mind. Rather, he allows for a dis-
tinction within the category of modifications in the mind between those which
actually modify the mind itself, such as perceptions, sensations, and thoughts,
and those which modify objects that are at least distinct from, if not external
to, the mind. This nuance in his philosophy of mind represents a major ad-
vance over the seemingly cruder conceptions of Malebranche and his fellow
Cartesians.
3 The Reducibility of Color
Having established that on Leibniz’s view color is a corporeal modification, let
us consider what sort of corporeal modification it is. In particular, is color a
fundamental, irreducible quality of the things it modifies, or is it reducible to
more fundamental qualities of those things? And if the latter, what are these
more fundamental qualities? Over the years most color theorists have favored
one form or another of the reductive approach. More exactly, they have tended
to view colors as reducible either to states or qualities of the mind (e.g., sen-
sations) or to some sort of property of bodies, either dispositional (e.g., the
disposition to cause certain experiences in perceivers) or categorical (e.g., the
complex microphysical property responsible for a body’s reflective character-
istics). As we will see in this section, Leibniz too opts for a reductive approach,
though unlike most of his fellow early modern philosophers, he does not seek
to reduce colors either to sensations or bodily dispositions. Instead, he seeks to
reduce them to qualities of the sort considered acceptable by the lights of the
physics of his day, that is, mechanical qualities such as shape and motion.
Not all color theorists favor a reductive approach. Those known as “prim-
itivists” hold that colors are just what they seem to be from a pre-theoretical
point of view: namely, primitive, irreducible properties of bodies. Perhaps the
chief reason these theorists have offered in support of their position is that the
nature of color seems to be fully revealed in our casual perceptions of it. As
Russell (1912, 47) famously put the point,
The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many
things said about it . . . . But such statements, though they make
17Cf. Adams’ suggestion that Leibnizian phenomena have the status of “intentional objects.”
What this means, according to Adams, is that “bodies, as phenomena, may be thought of as the
objects of a story—a story told or approximated by perception, common sense, and science. In
calling them phenomena Leibniz means that they have their being in perceptions that represent
this story to perceiving beings” (Adams, 1994, 219).
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me know truths about the colour, do not make me know the colour
itself any better than I did before: so far as concerns the knowledge
of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when
I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically
possible.18
This doctrine, which has come to be known as “revelation” (Johnston, 1992),
appears to entail the truth of primitivism, since the whole point of a reductive
approach is that colors are something other than what they appear to be to
the casual observer (e.g., sensations, dispositions, physical properties). If the
doctrine of revelation is true, then, any attempt to reduce colors to mechanical
qualities such as shapes and motions will be doomed from the start.
Although the doctrine of revelation was not explicitly formulated until many
years later, it is clear from Leibniz’s discussions of color that he rejects the doc-
trine, and along with it, the argument from that doctrine to primitivism. As he
explains in a prominent letter to the queen of Prussia, Sophie Charlotte,
We use the external senses as a blind man uses his stick, . . . and they
allow us to know their particular objects, which are colors, sounds,
odors, flavors, and tactile qualities. But they do not allow us to
know what these sensible qualities are, nor in what they consist.
For example, whether red is the rotation of certain small globes
that supposedly make up light; whether heat is a vortex of very
fine dust; whether sound is produced in air as circles are in water
when we toss a stone into it, as some philosophers suppose . . . . (GP
6:499/AG 186; cf. GP 4:550/WF 105)
Texts such as this clearly indicate that on Leibniz’s view the true nature of color
is not, contra Russell, laid bare in perception. Though the senses acquaint us
with colors, they do not reveal what those colors are, or in what they con-
sist. The doctrine of revelation is therefore false. Moreover, primitivism must
be false as well; for it follows from what Leibniz says that colors must be re-
ducible, at least in principle, to some underlying reality—that is, to what they
are or in what they consist.
More or less explicit affirmations of the reducibility of color can be found
in many of Leibniz’s writings. For instance, in a 1669 letter to his teacher Ja-
cob Thomasius, he writes: “[I]t is clear that the explanation of all qualities and
changes must be found in magnitude, figure, motion, etc., and that heat, color,
etc., are merely subtle motions and figures.” (GP 1:26/L 102). Nearly a decade
later, in a 1678 letter to Herman Conring, he makes essentially the same point:
“What is more probable than that all sensible qualities are merely tactual qual-
ities varying according to the variety of sense organs? But touch recognizes
only magnitude, motion, situation, or figure and various degrees of resistance
in bodies” (GP 1:197/L 189). Similarly, in other texts probably written around
this same time (i.e., the late 1670s), Leibniz emphasizes that on his view the
18This doctrine has also been endorsed by Strawson 1989, among others. For discussion see
Johnston 1992.
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“confused” attributes of the senses, including color, can always be reduced
to (or resolved into) “distinct” attributes such as size, shape, and motion (A
6.4:1961–62; A 6.4:2002–09/L 285–89). Remarks this explicit are hard to find
in later writings, but as we will see, those writings do contain indications that
Leibniz continues to think of color in this way.
As to which particular distinct qualities colors are to be reduced, Leibniz
is typically rather non-committal. We saw in the previous paragraph that
he evinces an awareness of the idea that red is “the rotation of certain small
globes” (GP 6:499/AG 186; cf. A 6.4:2002/L 285); yet he usually stops short
of endorsing such proposals. Still, his reluctance appears to spring solely from
doubts about the details of these accounts, and not about their general form:
he clearly thinks these are the right sorts of accounts to give of sensible quali-
ties. The only cases in which he does endorse a specific proposal are those of
white and black. He believes that “white is what reflects the most light and
black what reflects the least” (GP 1:19/L 96). Some years later, he refines his
proposal for white: “[W]hite bears no resemblance to a spherical convex mir-
ror, even though it is nothing but the assemblage of a number of small spheri-
cal mirrors, such as we see in froth upon close inspection.” (GP 4:575–76/WF
141). In characterizing white in this way, Leibniz seems to be suggesting that
the color really reduces to certain tiny shapes in the bodies that reflect light.19
Other remarks provide less explicit evidence for reading Leibniz this way.
For instance, in his Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas, he explains that
when we perceive colors or smells, we certainly have no perception
other than that of shapes and motions, though so very numerous
and so very small that our mind cannot distinctly consider each
individual one in this, its present state, and thus does not notice
that its perception is composed of perceptions of minute shapes and
motions alone, just as when we perceive the color green in a mixture
of yellow and blue powder, we sense only yellow and blue finely
mixed, even though we do not notice this, but rather fashion some
new thing for ourselves. (GP 4:426/AG 27)
When Leibniz claims that in perceiving colors “we certainly have no perception
other than that of shapes and motions,” the clear implication is that colors re-
ally just are shapes and motions; for otherwise in perceiving a color we would
be perceiving more than just those mechanical qualities. Furthermore, Leibniz
indicates in this text that our perceptions of color and other sensible qualities
are composed of petites perceptions of minute shapes and motions (cf. NE 56).
This point is significant because Leibniz also believes that if a perception P is
composed of perceptions p1, p2, . . . , pn, then that which P represents is com-
posed of those things which p1, p2, . . . , pn represent. As he explains in a letter
to Samuel Masson, “when there is a perception of the whole, there are at the
19At least one text suggests that Leibniz wants to reduce (reflective) colors not just to the me-
chanical qualities of reflective bodies, but also to those involved in the light itself, the medium,
and so forth (see GP 4:550/WF 105). This does not, however, appear to have been his considered
view.
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same time perceptions of the actual parts,” and “that which is composition of
parts outside is represented only by the composition of modifications in the
monad” (GP 6:628/AG 229; cf. NE 54). In claiming that our perceptions of
color are composed of perceptions of shapes and motions, therefore, Leibniz
appears to be suggesting that colors themselves are composed of shapes and
motions—that, in other words, colors are really just complexes of shapes and
motions.
In other passages Leibniz claims that our ideas and perceptions of sensible
qualities, including colors, represent tiny shapes and motions in bodies. For
instance, in the New Essays Theophilus argues that our ideas of sensible qual-
ities “depend on the detail of shapes and motions and express [i.e., represent]
them exactly, though we cannot disentangle this detail in the confusion of the
surpassing multitude and smallness of the mechanical actions which strike our
senses” (NE 403).20 But to say that an idea or perception represents a certain
thing is just to say that it is an idea or perception of that thing. Hence, if ideas
of sensible qualities represent shapes and motions, then the implication is that
these qualities just are shapes and motions.
The view Leibniz is espousing in these passages can plausibly be construed
as a forerunner of the view known as “physicalism” in contemporary discus-
sions of color. In saying this, of course, I do not mean to suggest that he is
anything like a physicalist in the more general sense according to which all
things are ultimately reducible to or supervenient on the physical. No doubt
Leibniz would have categorically rejected such a view, as he admits an infin-
ity of immaterial beings—monads or simple substances—that neither are nor
supervene on anything material or physical.21 But he does espouse something
close to the view known as physicalism about color, that is, the view that colors
are reducible to physical properties. For physical properties are roughly speak-
ing those properties accepted as legitimate in physics, and in Leibniz’s day
the properties fitting this description were mechanical qualities such as shape
and motion. In suggesting that colors can be reduced to such qualities, then,
Leibniz is fundamentally in agreement with the contemporary color physical-
ist, even though of course they differ concerning precisely which properties
should count as physical.
Perhaps a less misleading label for Leibniz’s view would be “mechanism,”
since the qualities to which he proposes to reduce colors are specifically me-
chanical.22 If we use this label, however, we must take care not to confuse
mechanism in this special sense with the sort of mechanism or “mechanical
philosophy” that prevailed during the early modern period. The latter view
is first and foremost a thesis about the explanation of natural phenomena. In
20Leibniz uses “expression” and “representation” interchangeably, so the claim being made here
is therefore that our ideas of sensible qualities represent the shapes and motions in bodies. Cf. NE
131–33, 165–66, GP 4:575/WF 141–42.
21Note that this more general form of physicalism does not entail physicalism about color, since
it is also consistent with the view that colors do not exist (eliminativism). Nor does physicalism
about color entail physicalism in the more general sense, since it is compatible with the existence
of non-physical entities such as souls.
22The name “mechanism” was suggested to me by David Hilbert.
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essence, it says that every occurrence in nature can (and should) be explained
in mechanical terms, that is, in terms of the shapes, sizes, and motions of bod-
ies. But to say this is not to say, or even to imply, that colors and other qualities
must reduce to the mechanical. For it is open to the mechanist to deny that col-
ors are part of the natural world. And in fact this is precisely the position most
early modern mechanists took. They construed colors as mere sensations in the
mind, and even though they allowed that these sensations have a mechanical
cause, they no more considered them to be reducible to the mechanical than
they considered the mind to be reducible to the material. Thus, most early
modern philosophers who were mechanists in the more familiar sense were
not mechanists in the special sense introduced here: they were mechanists in
the explanatory sense, but not in the reductive sense. Leibniz, in contrast, was
a mechanist in both senses. He agreed with his contemporaries that everything
in nature can and should be explained mechanically, but unlike most of them
he also thought that colors and other sensible qualities could be reduced to the
mechanical qualities of bodies.23
This sort of physicalist or mechanist approach to color is important to Leib-
niz for two closely related reasons. The first is his conviction that God has
created a maximally intelligible world, a world in which nothing is in princi-
ple inexplicable. Why is this relevant to the nature of color? Because on Leib-
niz’s view sensible qualities such as color are in themselves merely confused,
“occult” qualities. If colors were fundamental features of the universe, then,
it would follow that the universe is fundamentally inexplicable to the extent
that it is colored. Colors must therefore not be fundamental features of the uni-
verse. They must be reducible to, and explicable in terms of, more distinct and
intelligible qualities of bodies. But according to Leibniz the only such qualities
are mechanical qualities, and so sensible qualities must be reducible to such
qualities.24
A second reason for reducing colors to mechanical qualities stems from
Leibniz’s celebrated principle of sufficient reason (PSR), according to which
there is always a sufficient reason why things are one way rather than another.
As Leibniz has it, one corollary of this principle is that causes must always be
connected in some non-arbitrary fashion with their effects. Thus, there must
be some non-arbitrary connection between my ideas (and perceptions) of color
and their causes.25 According to Leibniz, however, such a connection could
obtain only if my ideas of color resembled their causes, which are mechanical
qualities. Hence, in order to satisfy the principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz
23Other philosophers from this period, including Boyle, Locke, and even Descartes, have been
read as advocating the view that sensible qualities can be reduced to mechanical ones (Alexander
1976/77, 206; Cottingham 1989/90). However, such readings tend to rest on flimsy evidence and
moreover conflict squarely with some things these philosophers say about sensible qualities (cf.
Keating 1993; Stuart 2003). In contrast, as I have argued, the evidence for ascribing this sort of
view to Leibniz is quite strong.
24See A 6.4:1961–62; A 6.4:2002–09/L 285–89.
25The causation in view here is “ideal” rather than “real” or “physical.” For a full account of the
difference, see Puryear 2010.
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thinks, my ideas of color must be similarly complex.26 More exactly, they must
be composed of simpler ideas which are themselves ideas of the mechanical
qualities that enter into their cause. As I pointed out above, however, to say
that our ideas of color are composed of ideas of mechanical qualities is just to
say that colors really are such qualities. So according to Leibniz, the principle
of sufficient reason requires that colors be reducible to the causes of our ideas
of color, that is, to certain mechanical qualities in bodies.
Whatever we might think of these reasons, one advantage of Leibniz’s ver-
sion of reductionism is that it allows him to say that a body’s color is ordinarily
at least part of what causes it to look colored, since he proposes to reduce col-
ors to properties of precisely the sort that cause bodies to reflect light as they
do. In contrast, it is far from clear that either the primitivist or the disposition-
alist can say this, since the former construes colors as properties of a sort that
do not figure into our best scientific accounts of how bodies reflect light, and
dispositions, even dispositions to reflect light, do not cause bodies to reflect
light.27
Let us conclude this section by considering a notorious complication for the
sort of physicalist or mechanist approach Leibniz endorses. In brief, the prob-
lem is that there appears to be no single, non-dispositional physical property
to which all instances of a given color can be reduced. At best a color could be
reduced only to a rather heterogeneous class of physical properties, or else to a
single, highly disjunctive physical property. This might not seem to be much of
a problem, and in fact some color physicalists have been happy to concede that
colors are really something like highly disjunctive physical properties.28 Nev-
ertheless, the worry remains that insofar as the physicalist approach involves
reducing colors to rather heterogeneous groups of physical properties, it seems
to run roughshod over the apparent fact that colors are “natural” properties,
properties that carve nature at the joints.
This point about the diversity of the physical bases of color has come to
the fore in recent years as physicalist theories have become more popular and
as our understanding of these bases has improved. But the basic point is not a
new one; it had been made as far back as the seventeenth century by the French
physicist Edme´ Mariotte (1681/1717). As Leibniz tells us in the New Essays,
Mariotte was of the opinion that “the blue of the rainbow has an entirely differ-
ent origin from the blue of a turquoise” (NE 309). Leibniz was therefore quite
alive to the possibility that the physical bases of any given color might be rather
diverse, and he readily admits that “although there is no outer appearance that
is not grounded in the inner constitution, it is nevertheless true that a single
appearance can sometimes result from two different constitutions” (ibid.). At
the same time, however, he acknowledges the point that colors should be seen
as natural properties, or in his terminology, “real species.” Hence, he insists
that no matter how different these inner constitutions may be, they must have
26See GP 4:575–76/WF 141–42; NE 56, 131–32, 165–66, 381–82; LDB 51; T 340, 356.
27As Jackson & Pargetter (1987, 69) put the point, dispositions do not cause their realizations.
For a defense of primitivism in connection with this point, see Watkins 2002.
28See, e.g., Smart 1975; Armstrong 1987.
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some distinguishing feature in common which sets them apart from all other
constitutions:
[A]lthough no outer appearance fails to be grounded in an inner
constitution, it it is nevertheless true that a single appearance can
sometimes result from two different constitutions. However, they
will have something in common, and this is what we philosophers
call the immediate formal cause. But even if that were not so, as if ac-
cording to M. Mariotte the blue of the rainbow has an entirely dif-
ferent origin from the blue of a turquoise, without a common formal
cause (on this I am not of his opinion), and even if we agreed that
certain apparent natures . . . had nothing internal in common, our
definitions would still be grounded in real species; for the phenom-
ena themselves are realities. We can therefore say that everything
that we truthfully distinguish or compare is also distinguished or
made alike by nature . . . . (ibid.)
On Leibniz’s view, then, the various mechanical qualities to which the in-
stances of a given color reduce (i.e., the various inner constitutions that give
rise to that appearance) must share at least the same “immediate formal cause”
(whatever exactly this amounts to). Yet even if this were not the case, as Mari-
otte believes in the case of blue, and even if these inner constitutions had noth-
ing in common internally, Leibniz thinks they would still have something in
common externally, because “the phenomena themselves are realities.” What
he means by this is not entirely clear, but the thought is apparently that these
rather diverse inner constitutions tend to produce qualitatively identical phe-
nomena in perceivers, and for this reason form a real species. By Leibniz’s
lights, then, the diversity of the reductive bases of color does not prevent color
from being a kind of natural property.
4 The Threat of Incoherence
According to the argument so far, Leibniz combines a nuanced subjectivism
about color with a reduction of colors to the micromechanical qualities of bod-
ies, the result being a distinctive approach with a number of advantages. As a
form of subjectivism, his view explains how we can know the colors of particu-
lar objects in spite of the highly variable nature of color appearances. But at the
same time, he wisely refuses to construe colors as modifications of the mind, as
many subjectivists have, and he stops short of the sort of radical subjectivism
that precludes errors in color perception. Finally, by adopting a mechanist ap-
proach, he is able to preserve the insight that the colors of bodies are ordinarily
part of what causes them to appear colored—an insight that primitivists and
dispositionalists struggle to preserve.
All in all, an impressive array of advantages. Yet the attentive reader will
have begun to suspect that these advantages can be had only at the expense
of coherence. For if colors exist only in the mind, as Leibniz holds, it seems
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incoherent to suppose that they can be reduced to the shapes and motions of
bodies, the latter being qualities that apparently exist outside the mind. Like-
wise, if colors are perception-dependent features of the world, it’s hard to see
how they can be reduced without remainder to shapes and motions, which are
widely believed to be perception-independent features of the world. Further, if
colors exist only in the mind and bodies exist outside the mind, then how could
the former be modifications of the latter? After all, a modification is simply a
way of being, and it’s hard to see how the way of being of a thing could be
anywhere but where the being itself exists. As Leibniz himself admits, “Acci-
dents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the
sensible species of the Scholastics once did” (GP 6:607–8/AG 214). For all its
advantages, then, Leibniz’s theory of color appears to bristle with tensions.
Let us begin with the first of these problems. One point Leibniz might make
in his defense turns on his view of the ontological status of aggregates. As we
have seen, he proposes to reduce colors to shapes and motions. But properly
speaking the idea is not that a given color reduces to some one shape or motion.
For given that bodies are divided to infinity, there can be no shape in bodies
which is not itself composed of many smaller shapes; and the motions to which
colors reduce would appear to be composed of many smaller motions. So in re-
ality each color is being reduced to what Leibniz would call an “aggregate” or
“assemblage” of shapes and motions, just as white reduces to an “assemblage
of a number of small spherical mirrors” (GP 4:575–76/WF 141). On Leibniz’s
view, however, an assemblage or aggregate of things does not necessarily have
the same ontological status as those things of which it is an assemblage. In par-
ticular, Leibniz maintains that aggregates have a merely mental existence, even
when they are aggregates of things that exist outside the mind. So given this,
there’s nothing obviously incoherent about the suggestion that colors, which
exist only in the mind, are reducible to assemblages of shapes and motions,
since such assemblages also exist in the mind.
This fact is significant because Leibniz also emphasizes that aggregates and
the like do not exist independently of perception, even if the items of which
they are aggregates do. The point typically comes up in Leibniz’s discussions
of bodies being aggregates or assemblages of monads. Though he believes that
as per se unities, the monads themselves do exist independently of their be-
ing perceived, the same cannot be said of aggregates of them. Like anything
which exists, aggregates of monads have a kind of unity, but their unity is only
a unity per accidens that is provided by the perceiving substance. They have
their unity in perception, and therefore, Leibniz concludes, they have their
being in perception too, being and unity being on his view interchangeable.
As Philalethes, his representative in the “Conversation between Philalethe and
Ariste,” explains: “body does not have a true unity; it is only an aggregate, what
the schools call one per accidens, an assemblage like a flock; its unity comes from
our perception. It is a being of reason, or, rather, of imagination, a phenomenon”
(GP 6:586/AG 263). Leibniz displays the inference from mental unity to mental
being even more explicitly in this text from the New Essays:
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[A]t bottom it must be admitted that this unity of collections is only
a respect or relation the foundation of which is in that which we
find in each of the individual substances taken alone. Thus these
beings by aggregation have only a mental unity, and consequently
their being is also in a way mental, or phenomenal, like that of a
rainbow. (NE 146)
Though in these texts Leibniz has in mind collections of substances or mon-
ads, it would be reasonable to infer that what he says about them applies to
collections in general. For if collections of true unities have a merely mental
unity and existence, then collections of phenomenal qualities such as shapes
and motions could hope for no more. We may therefore conclude that on Leib-
niz’s view aggregates or assemblages depend on perception and exist only in
the mind, even if the aggregated things exist outside the mind and indepen-
dently of perception.29
But this is not the only or even the most salient point Leibniz could make
in response to this first concern. Even apart from his admittedly idiosyncratic
(though not obviously implausible) views on the nature of aggregates, there
remains the fact that the tension between his subjectivism and his mechanism
arises only if we assume that Leibniz, like nearly all early modern philoso-
phers, believes that shapes and motions, unlike colors, exist outside the mind.
Only under this assumption does his belief that colors exist only in the mind
conflict with his belief that color is reducible to the micromechanical qualities
of bodies. Yet this assumption is manifestly false. For Leibniz is no less a sub-
jectivist about shapes and motions than he is about color.
It may come as little surprise that Leibniz was a subjectivist about the ge-
ometrical qualities of bodies during his later years, that is, from around 1700
until his death in 1716, since it was during this time that he expounded his
monadological metaphysics in the clearest and most unequivocal terms. Ac-
cording to this metaphysics, everything in the created world ultimately re-
duces to monads or simple substances and their modifications, together with
the phenomena that result from them; and in particular, the entire corporeal
world, including bodies and all their qualities, reduce to phenomena (see, e.g.,
GP 2:270/AG 181; GP 6:589/AG 265). Hence, given his belief that phenomena
exist only in the mind and have their being in perception, it stands to reason
that Leibniz was a subjectivist about all aspects of the corporeal world during
these later years. But in fact his most explicit and revealing endorsements of
subjectivism about shapes and motions are to be found in the writings of his
so-called “middle years,” that is, roughly, the 1680s and 90s. For instance, here
is what he says in an essay many scholars date to the 1680s: “Concerning bod-
ies I can demonstrate that not merely light, heat, color, and similar qualities are
apparent but also motion, figure, and extension. And that if anything is real,
it is solely the force of acting and suffering, and hence that the substance of a
body consists in this (as if in matter and form)” (A 6.4:1504/L 365).30 I noted
29For a further defense of this claim, see Adams (1994, ch. 9) and Lodge (2001).
30On the dating of this essay, see A 6.4:1498.
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above that in Leibniz’s terminology apparent qualities are qualities things have
“only insofar as they act on us” (A 6.4:555), and that he thinks phenomena or
appearances exist only in the soul. In saying that the shapes and motions of
bodies are apparent rather than real, therefore, Leibniz seems to be suggesting
that these qualities exist only in the mind and depend on perception for their
existence.
Leibniz explains one of his reasons for treating shape as a phenomenon in
another text from the same period, a 1687 letter to Arnauld:
[Matter] does not even have the exact and fixed qualities that could
make it pass for a determined being . . . since even shape, which is
of the essence of an extended, bounded mass, is never exact or rig-
orously determined, because of the actual division to infinity of the
parts of matter. There is never a globe without irregularities, or a
straight line without intermingling curves, or a curve of a certain fi-
nite nature without being mixed with some other, and this in small
parts as in large ones; so that shape, far from being constitutive of
bodies, is not even an entirely real and determinate quality outside
of thought, and we can never assign to some body a certain precise
surface, as we could if there were atoms. And I can say the same
thing about size and motion, namely, that these qualities or predi-
cates are of the nature of phenomena, like colors and sounds, and
though they involve more distinct knowledge, they can no more
sustain a final analysis . . . . (GP 2:119/L 343)
In this intriguing passage, Leibniz argues that shape is “not even an entirely
real and determinate quality outside of thought” and that it is “of the nature
of phenomena, like colors and sounds.” The precise nature of the argument
is a matter of debate, and I will not enter into that debate here.31 But let me
at least register that in my opinion the argument is most plausibly interpreted
along the following lines. Leibniz claims that we “can never assign a definite
and precise surface to any body, as could be done if there were atoms,” be-
cause no matter what shape we might assign to a body—no matter what shape
it might appear to have—closer inspection, perhaps with the use of an instru-
ment, would reveal a different, more complex shape, which it would be nat-
ural to consider a closer approximation to the “true” shape of the body. This
process of shapes giving way to shapes would eventually terminate, Leibniz
thinks, if there were material atoms. But as he emphasizes in this passage, he
rejects atoms and therefore must hold that no shape we could ever assign to a
body could be anything more than just an apparent shape; it could not be the
true shape of the body. So interpreted, this argument for the phenomenality
of shape is structurally similar to the argument discussed in Section 1 above in
which Leibniz purports to establish the phenomenality of color by appealing
to the example of a green powder which looks yellow and blue when viewed
through a microscope.
31See Adams 1994, 229-32; Levey 2005; Crockett 2005.
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Leibniz’s main argument for the phenomenality of motion begins to take
shape as early as the late 1670s. One of the more insightful versions can be
found in a brief note from that period:
That matter and motion are only phenomena, or contain in them-
selves something imaginary, can be understood from the fact that
different and contradictory hypotheses can be made about them,
all of which nevertheless satisfy the phenomena perfectly, so that
no reason can be devised for determining which of them should
be preferred. In real things, on the other hand, every truth can be
accurately discovered and demonstrated. Thus concerning motion
I have shown elsewhere that it is not possible to determine which
subject it is in; . . . . (A 6.4:1463/LC 257)
Leibniz alludes here to the equivalence of hypotheses concerning motion, that
is, the idea that in any situation in which a number of bodies appear to move,
what we experience is consistent with an infinite number of hypotheses, each
of which assigns motion or rest to the bodies in a different way. He goes on to
claim that we have no non-arbitrary way of determining which of these infin-
ity of hypotheses is correct: “no reason can be devised for determining which
of them should be preferred.” Then he introduces the key premise of his argu-
ment, namely, that in real things “every truth can be accurately discovered and
demonstrated.” Since the equivalence of hypotheses about motion prevents us
from discovering and demonstrating which bodies are moving and to what de-
gree, Leibniz concludes that motion must not be real but rather a phenomenon
or appearance.32 This is a conclusion which he repeats many times over the
years, and the argument he usually seems to have in mind for this conclusion
is this argument from the equivalence of hypotheses.
Notice that this argument from the relativity of motion resembles the rel-
ativity arguments for color and heat that Leibniz offers in his comments on
Descartes’ Principles. All these arguments begin with a premise to the effect
that the appearance of the modification in question is relative to a perspective:
the apparent colors of an object are relative to how it is viewed, the hotness
or coldness of the water to which hand we use to sense it, and motions to
which frame of reference we privilege over the others. Further, the arguments
for color and heat, like the argument for motion, seem to rely at least implic-
itly on two additional premises: first, that we have no non-arbitrary way of
discovering and demonstrating which appearance (if any) corresponds to real-
ity, and second, that with real rather than apparent things “every truth can be
accurately discovered and demonstrated.” Leibniz’s point would seem to be
that if heat and color were real, non-apparent qualities of bodies, we would be
able to discover and even demonstrate truths about bodies having or lacking
those qualities, truths such as that certain bodies are hot while other are not,
32Properly speaking, Leibniz’s position is that we cannot discover the true subjects of motion if
we consider motion in itself, rather than with respect to its cause. For more on this, see Puryear
Forthcoming-b, §3.1; cf. Puryear Forthcoming-c, §1.
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and that some bodies are red while others are green, and so on. But because
of the relativity of these qualities, he thinks, we will never be in a position to
demonstrate such truths. Hence, he concludes that colors and other sensible
qualities are not real but merely apparent qualities, and for the same reason he
also concludes that motion is only an appearance.
For Leibniz, then, shapes and motions are just as subjective as colors, and
for essentially the same reasons. All of them are perception-dependent fea-
tures of the world, and all of them exist only in the mind. Thus, there’s no
obvious reason why colors and other such sensible qualities cannot be reduced
to shapes and motions.
Similar considerations allow us to dispense with the second of the two wor-
ries raised at the beginning of this section. If bodies exist outside the mind,
then it is hard to see how their colors and other qualities could exist only in the
mind, since these qualities are supposed to be modifications or ways of being of
bodies. On Leibniz’s view, however, bodies do not exist outside the mind. Like
colors, shapes, and motions, they are phenomena—beings of perception—and
as such exist only in the mind.33 There is therefore nothing obviously incoher-
ent about his claim that colors are modifications of bodies. In fact, if bodies
themselves exist only in the mind, then it stands to reason that their modifica-
tions would exist there too.
At the end of the day, then, Leibniz’s metaphysics of color appears inter-
nally consistent. Considered against the background of certain widely held
beliefs about the nature of bodies and their mechanical qualities, his subjec-
tivism clearly stands in tension with his mechanist reduction. But given his
own background beliefs, the two components of his theory appear perfectly
compatible. There is nonetheless a catch. Although Leibniz’s theory offers a
number of advantages, it manages to achieve consistency only by being paired
with a thoroughgoing idealism about bodies and their mechanical qualities
that most philosophers would find highly objectionable. Indeed most would
probably regard the theory’s reliance on idealism as nothing less than a fa-
tal flaw, one too great to be overcome by its comparatively paltry though still
substantial attractions. Be that as it may, I hope to have shown that Leibniz’s
reflections on the nature of color are rich enough in insights and suggestive
ideas to make those reflections worthy of our attention, even if in the end we
find ourselves unable to accept his theory in toto.34
33See, e.g., Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, GP 2:96–97, 100–101/AG 85–86, 89; Leibniz to
de Volder, 30 June 1704, GP 2:268, 270/AG 179, 181; Leibniz to de Volder, n.d., GP 2:275–76/AG
181–82. The question when Leibniz came to think of bodies as phenomena has been the subject of
considerable debate. I will not enter into that debate here, but let me at least register my support
for the view that Leibniz adopted a phenomenalism about bodies rather early on, perhaps as early
as 1677. Cf. Mercer 2001.
34Versions of this material were presented to audiences at Washington University in St. Louis;
the University of Miami; Stanford University; the University of Illinois at Chicago; the University
of California, Santa Barbara; California State University, Chico; the University of Alabama; and
the 2010 joint meeting of the North Carolina Philosophical Society and the South Carolina Society
for Philosophy. I would like to thank the many discussants in these audiences, as well as Michael
Pendlebury and an anonymous referee for this journal, for their insightful feedback.
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